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Abstract. Nowadays, the utilization of the ever expanding amount of
data has made a huge impact on web technologies while also causing var-
ious types of security concerns. On one hand, potential gains are highly
anticipated if different organizations could somehow collaboratively share
their data for technological improvements. On the other hand, data se-
curity concerns may arise for both data holders and data providers due
to commercial or sociological concerns. To make a balance between tech-
nical improvements and security limitations, we implement secure and
scalable protocols for multiple data holders to train linear regression and
logistic regression models. We build our protocols based on the secret
sharing scheme, which is scalable and efficient in applications. Moreover,
our proposed paradigm can be generalized to any secure multiparty train-
ing scenarios where only matrix summation and matrix multiplications
are used. We demonstrate our approach by experiments which shows the
scalability and efficiency of our proposed protocols, and finally present
its real-world applications.
Keywords: Linear regression, logistic regression, shared machine learning, se-
cret sharing
1 Introduction
With the ever expanding collection of data, there have been increasing concerns
on the security and privacy issues when utilizing big data to facilitate technolog-
ical improvement. On the customer side, privacy concerns arise when individual
information is collected with potential risk of leakage [4], while on the collector
side, there are security concerns since the collectors are always willing to protect
their own resources including data.
Meanwhile, there is increasingly potential gains in terms of analytical power
if different organizations could collaboratively combine their data assets for data
mining or information retrieval. For example, health data from different hospitals
can be used together to facilitate more accurate diagnosis [17], while financial
companies can collaborate to train more effective fraud-detection engines [28].
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2 Chaochao Chen et al.
The major task is to combine data from multiple entities so as to improve
model training performance while still protecting data securities for individual
holders from any possibility of information disclosure, i.e., shared machine learn-
ing in literature [25,19,28,3,5]. The security and privacy concern, together with
the desire of data combination poses an important challenge for both academia
and industry.
To derive an application-oriented solution to the above challenges, we design
secure multiparty protocols based on the classical secret sharing scheme, which
is efficient in both computational and communicational costs. We restrict our
attention to the simple yet widely used regression models in industry, i.e., lin-
ear regression and logistic regression, and consider two scenarios (vertical and
horizontal) of data partitioning among data holders.
1.1 Our Contribution
We summarize the main contributions as follows.
– We make a computational reduction from the multiparty training of regression
models to secure multiparty matrix summation and secure two party matrix
multiplications. This paradigm is quite different from previous work in this
area [20] since for the gradient descent step in Equation (3), although the
calculation of subtraction can be implemented easily via secret sharing, the
matrix multiplications can not be easily generalized to arbitrary number of
parties and so their training protocols are not applicable to multiparty cases.
Our paradigm takes the secure two-party matrix multiplication protocol as a
complete ‘black-box’, which means any secure matrix product protocols can
be “embedded” into our paradigm to train regression models. By reducing the
matrix multiplications for multiple data holders into matrix multiplications for
two parties, we can even generalize our paradigm to any training process other
than linear regression and logistic regression. As long as the training process
involves only summation (subtraction) and multiplication, our method can be
applied. We also remark that for some special functions like sigmoid functions,
we can apply polynomial approximations to transform the special functions
into summation and multiplication.
– We conduct empirical studies on our proposed method and experimentally
verify that our protocols achieve exactly the same performance while the ad-
ditional overhead for the computation and communication costs scale linearly
with data size. This demonstrates that our proposed method can be applied
into large scale datasets.
1.2 Related Work
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) was initiated in [26], which aims to
generate methods (or protocals) for multi-parties to jointly compute a function
(e.g., vector multiplication) over their inputs (e.g., vector for each party) while
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keeping those inputs private. Different schemes can be used to design MPC pro-
tocols, such as garbled circuits [27] and secret sharing [24]. MPC makes the
secure collaboration between different data holders possible, and has been ap-
plied to implement many secure machine learning algorithms, such as decision
tree [18], linear regression [22,11,20,15,13], logistic regression [8,20,16], neural
networks [20,28], and recommender system [3,5].
The most similar work to ours is SecureML [20], however, we are differ-
ent from them in mainly three aspects. First, since the SGD update step in
[20] is fully secret-shared for each matrix operation in Equation (3), secure ma-
trix product cannot be easily generalized to multiple parties. Second, SecureML
adopts the techniques of arithmatic sharing, boolean sharing, and Yao sharing
for secure machine learning. Although it provides fruitful protocols for academic
researchers to build any machine learning models, it also increases the difficulty
for industrial practitioners deploy customized models. Thirdly, our protocol un-
der vertically data partition setting has less communication complexity, since we
only need to secretly share models and labels instead of features. These are the
main differences between the training protocol in [20] and ours.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Linear Regression and Logistic Regression
Linear Regression. Linear gression is popularly used in industry due to its
simply yet robust ability. Given m data samples xi ∈ Rd each with d dimensional
input features and output labels yi ∈ R, regression is a statistical method to
learn a fitting function f : Rd → R such that f(xi) ≈ yi for all i ∈ [m]. Note
that, without loss of generality, we use italic text (e.g., yi) for variables, lower-
case bold letters (e.g., w) for vectors, and upper-case bold letters (e.g., X) for
matrices. In linear regression, we assume that f can be represented as a linear
combination of the input features, i.e., f(xi) =
∑d
j=1 xijwj = xi ·w, where xij
is the jth feature of sample xi and wj is the jth coefficient of w. The value
yˆi = f(xi) is called the predictive value on xi. To learn the coefficient vector w,
square loss is commonly used:
Lli(w) =
1
2
m∑
i=1
(yˆi − yi)2, (1)
which measures the total difference between the predictive values and the true
labels. The objective is to minimize this loss function, which is also known as
the least squares estimation.
Logistic Regression. Logistic regression is also widely used for binary clas-
sification tasks in practice, in which each data sample xi ∈ Rd has an output
label y ∈ {0, 1}. The fitting function f , also called the activation function in this
setting, can be represented as the logistic function of the weighted combination
of the input features: f(xi) =
1
1+e−xi·w .
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To train the coefficients w of the model, an information-theoretic loss func-
tion called cross entropy is used:
Llo(w) = −
m∑
i=1
(yi log yˆi + (1− yi) log(1− yˆi)) , (2)
where yˆi = f(xi) is the predictive value of data sample xi. The cross entropy
measures the total distributional difference between the predictive values and
the true labels over all data samples and the objective of logistic regression is to
minimize it. Note that we omit the regularization terms for conciseness.
2.2 Mini-Batch Stochastic Gradient Descent
Mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is an efficient iterative algorithm
for optimizing a global function. In linear regression and logistic regression, the
goal is to find a best-fit coefficient vector w which minimizes of the loss function.
Let XB (resp. yB) be the |B| × d (resp. |B| × 1) submatrices of X (resp. y),
where the row indices are all from batch B. For linear regression and logistic
regression, the update equation for batch SGD is as follows:
w := w− α|B|X
T
B × (yˆB − yB), (3)
where α is the learning rate which controls the moving magnitude.
2.3 Secure Multiparty Computation
Suppose n parties individually hold private data x1, x2, · · · , xn and g is a mul-
tivariate function with n variables over arbitrary domain (e.g. boolean, inte-
ger, or real). Secure multiparty computation aims at designing protocols for
the n parties to collaboratively compute g(x1, x2, · · · , xn) such that at the end
of the protocol, each party gets the value g(x1, x2, · · · , xn) without being able
to explorer any information of other party’s private data. Specifically, secure
multi-party computation is a multi-party random process. Take two parties
for example, it maps pairs of inputs (one from each party) to pairs of out-
puts (one for each party), while preserving several security properties, such as
correctness, privacy, and independence of inputs [14]. This random process is
called functionality. Formally, denote a two-output functionality f = (f1, f2) as
f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗. For a pair of inputs (x, y), where x is
from party P1 and y is from party P2, the output pair (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) is a
random variable. f1(x, y) is the output for P1, and f2(x, y) is for P2. During this
process, neither party should learn anything more than its prescribed output.
There are fruitful methods such as garbled circuit and secret sharing for
designing secure protocols, among which the secret sharing scheme is the most
efficient one in practice. The very basic idea of secret sharing is that each data
holder divide its own data into completely random shares and distribute the
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shares among different parities. In running the protocol, each party do local
computations based on its shares coming from other parties and the final result
can be recovered via global communication. In this paper, we use 〈x〉i to denote
the i-th share of a secret x, which can be generalized to vectors and matrices.
One should note that secret sharing only works in finite field, since random
shares should be generated in uniform distribution to guarantee security. We
use fix-point approximation following the existing research [20].
Security Model. In this paper, we consider the standard semi-honest model,
where a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary with semi-honest behaviors is
considered. Take two parties for example, in this security model, the adversary
may corrupt and control one party (referred as to the corrupted party), and try to
obtain information about the input of the other party (referred as to the honest
party). During the protocol execution with the honest party, the adversary will
follow the protocol specification, but may attempt to obtain additional infor-
mation about the honest party’s input by analyzing the corrupted party’s view,
i.e., the transcripts it receives during the protocol execution. In order to ensure
correctness and privacy, the following formal security definition is proposed [12].
Definition 1 (Security in semi-honest model).
Let f = (f1, f2) be a deterministic functionality and pi be a two-party protocol
for computing f . Given the security parameter κ, and a pair of inputs (x, y)
(where x is from P1 and y is from P2), the view of Pi (i = 1, 2) in the protocol
pi is denoted as viewpii (x, y, κ) = (w, ri,m
1
i , · · · ,mti), where w ∈ {x, y}, ri is the
randomness used by Pi, and m
j
i is the j-th message received by Pi; the output
of Pi is denoted as output
pi
i (x, y, κ), and the joint output of the two parties is
outputpi(x, y, κ) = (outputpi1 (x, y, κ)), output
pi
2 (x, y, κ)). We say that pi securely
computes f in semi-honest model if
– There exist probabilistic polynomial-time simulators S1 and S2, such that
{S1(1κ, x, f1(x, y))}x,y,κ ∼= {viewpi1 (x, y, κ)}x,y,κ,
{S2(1κ, y, f2(x, y))}x,y,κ ∼= {viewpi2 (x, y, κ)}x,y,κ.
– The joint output and the functionality output satisfy
{outputpi(x, y, κ)}x,y,κ ∼= {f(x, y)}x,y,κ,
where x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, and ∼= denotes computationally indistinguishablity.
3 Secret Sharing based Secure Multiparty Regressions
3.1 Scenarios
We mainly consider two scenarios of data partitioning, as is shown in Figure . In
the first scenario, data are partitioned horizontally among multiple parties, which
means each party holds a subset of data samples and the data in different parities
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Fig. 1. Data partition scenarios.
have the same feature dimensions. In the second scenario, data are partitioned
vertically, where each party holds a subset of features over all samples and the
sample indices of different parties have already been aligned.
For notational convenience in describing the protocol, we use Ai to denote
the i-th party involved in the protocol, where i ∈ [n] and n is the total number of
all parties. Using secret sharing, we use {〈X〉i}i∈[n] to denote the set of shares of
X such that X =
∑n
i=1 〈X〉i. Here X could be the original data, or secret-shares,
or intermediate data during the algorithm procedure. 〈X〉i is called the i-share
of data X, which is the fraction of data X distributed to Ai.
To securely train linear regression and logistic regression models, the crucial
point is to design a protocol for multiple parties such that the SGD step in
Equation (3) can be conducted securely among different parties. We will describe
our secure protocols for both scenarios in the following sections.
Threat Model. Simialr as the existing researches [20], we use the semi-honest
(passive) adversary model, where the participants stricly follow the protocol,
but may try to infer additional information from the middle messages during
the protocol execution. Comparing with malicious (active) adversary model,
semi-honest adversary model enables the development of highly efficient secure
computation protocols and has been widely used to develop secure machine
learning applications [8].
3.2 Protocols For Horizontally Partitioned Data
For secure linear regression and logistic regression models, the general idea is to
locally sample a batch from one party in each iteration and do the computation
in Equation (3) via secret sharing. The crucial point for calculations in Equa-
tion (3) is that every arithmetical operation (including matrix subtraction and
multiplication) has to be secret-shared so that none of the other parties can get
any information from the current party who generates the batch.
Secure Linear Regression Protocol. We first present the secure protocol for
linear regresion under horizontally partitioned data in Algorithm 1. As the data
are horizontally partitioned among parties, we have
XT =
((
X1
)T
,
(
X2
)T
, ..., (Xn)
T
)
,
yT =
((
y1
)T
,
(
y2
)T
, ..., (yn)
T
)
,
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Algorithm 1: Linear regression protocol for horizontally partitioned data
Input: Feature matrices Xi and label vectors yi for all party Ai(i ∈ [n]),
learning rate (α), and maximum iterations (T )
Output: Coefficient vectors wi such that w =
∑n
i=1wi where w is the
coefficient vector for the regression model
1 for i = 1 to n in parallel do
2 Ai initializes wi
3 end
4 for t = 1 to T do
5 n parties randomly select i ∈ [n] via protocol
6 Ai locally samples batches XiB and yiB
7 Ai locally generates
{〈
XiB
〉
j
}
j∈[n]
and
{〈
yiB
〉
j
}
j∈[n]
8 Ai distributes
{〈
XiB
〉
j
}
j 6=i
and
{〈
yiB
〉
j
}
j 6=i
to other parties
9 Ai locally calculates
〈
XiB
〉
i
×wi as i-share
10 for j 6= i do
11 Aj locally calculates
〈
XiB
〉
j
×wj as j-share
12 Ai and Aj calculate i-share
〈〈
XiB
〉
i
×wj
〉
i
and j-share
〈〈
XiB
〉
i
×wj
〉
j
via SMM protocol
13 Ai and Aj calculate i-share
〈〈
XiB
〉
j
×wi
〉
i
and j-share〈〈
XiB
〉
j
×wi
〉
j
via SMM protocol
14 end
15 for j = 1 to n in parallel do
16 Aj locally calculates the summation of all j-shares, denoted as〈
XiB ×w
〉
j
17 Aj locally calculates errj =
〈
XiB ×w
〉
j
− 〈yiB〉j
18 Aj clears its j-shares to zero value
19 end
20 for j = 1 to n in paralle do
21 Aj locally calculates
〈
XiB
〉T
j
× errj as j-share
22 for k = 1 to n and k 6= j do
23 Aj and Ak calculates j-share
〈〈
XiB
〉T
k
× errj
〉
j
and k-share〈〈
XiB
〉T
k
× errj
〉
k
via SMM protocol
24 end
25 end
26 for j = 1 to n in parallel do
27 Aj locally calculates the summation of all j-shares, denoted as gradj
28 Aj locally updates wj by wj ← wj − α|B| · gradj
29 end
30 end
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where XT denotes the transpose of matrix X, each sample in the feature matrix
X is a row vector and the label vector y is a column vector.
The for loops with ‘in parallel’ means that the n parties should do the
steps within the loop in parallel. SMM is short for Secure Matrix Multiplication.
Notice that when we call a SMM protocol, we assume that the parties each
has one matrix whose dimensions are aligned to calculate the matrix product.
Existing SMM protocols can be used as a black-box procedure in Line 12, 13 and
23. Line 5 is a protocol that determines whose data are selected to update model
in the current batch, e.g., this can be simply sequential protocol that indicates
all the participants’ data are used to train the regression model sequentially.
SMM protocols. SMM protocol makes sure that each of the parties (1) holds
a secret share matrix such that the summation of the shares equals the matrix
product, and (2) only gets the output, i.e., the secret share matrix, but not other
middle information. To date, different SMM protocols have been proposed, they
can be divided into two types, i.e., SMM with trusted initializer [7] and SMM
without trusted initializer [29]. The main difference is that the former needs
a trusted third-party to generate Beaver triples for the participates before the
protocols starts, while the later one bypass the trusted initializer by sacrificing
some security guarantee.
Secure Logistic Regression Protocol. One can slightly modify Algorithm
1 to change it from linear regression to logistic regression. The only difference
is the calculation of predictive values, i.e., from xi ·w to 11+e−xi·w . For logistic
regression, to compute the logistic function using secret sharing, we approximate
it by a k-order polynomial
1
1 + e−z
≈
k∑
j=0
qjz
j . (4)
Existing researches proposed different coefficients (qj) for logistic function
[1,6]. Here, we follow the 3-order polynomial in [1], i.e., q0 = 0.5, q1 = 0.197,
q2 = 0, and q3 = 0.004. With this in mind, the logistic function can be easily
approximated by using SMM protocol. We omit the details for conciseness.
3.3 Protocol For Vertically Partitioned Data
Secure Linear Regression Protocol. We first summarize the secure protocol
for linear regression in Algorithm 2. Since the data matrix is vertically parti-
tioned, we only need to secretly share models (Line 4) and labels (Line 7) among
participants. Each participant calculates shares of the prediction by using SMM
protocol (Lines 8-12), and During model training, each participant gets a share
of the prediction (Line 15), error (Line 16), and gradients (Line 26), updates
the shared models (Line 27), and finally reconstruct their corresponding models
(Line 35). Similar as the protocol in horizontally partitioned data in Algorithm
1, Algorithm 2 also works for any number of participants.
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Algorithm 2: Linear regression protocol for vertically partitioned data
Input: Feature matrices Xi for party Ai(i ∈ [n]), label vector y located in
party Ak, learning rate (α), and maximum iterations (T )
Output: Coefficient vectors wi such that w
T =
(
(w1)
T , (w2)
T , · · · , (wn)T
)
where w is the coefficient vector for the regression model
1 All n parties agreed on a sequence of batches B1, B2, · · · , BT
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Ai initializes wi
4 Ai generates shares {〈wi〉j}j∈[n] and distributes
{
〈wi〉j
}
j 6=i
to others
5 end
6 for t = 1 to T do
7 Ak generates shares
{〈
yBt
〉
j
}
j∈[n]
and distributes
{〈
yBt
〉
j
}
j 6=k
to others
8 for i = 1 to n do
9 Ai locally calculates XiBt × 〈wi〉i as i-share
10 for j = 1 to n and j 6= i do
11 Ai and Aj calculate i-share
〈
XiBt × 〈wi〉j
〉
i
and j-share〈
XiBt × 〈wi〉j
〉
j
via SMM protocol
12 end
13 end
14 for j = 1 to n in parallel do
15 Aj locally calculates the sum of all j-shares, denoted as 〈XBt ×w〉j
16 Aj locally calculates 〈err〉j = 〈XBt ×w〉j −
〈
yBt
〉
j
17 end
18 for i = 1 to n do
19 Ai locally calculates 〈err〉Ti ×XiBt as i-share of gradi
20 for j = 1 to n and j 6= i do
21 Ai and Aj calculate i-share
〈〈err〉ti ×XjBt〉i and j-share〈〈err〉ti ×XjBt〉j of gradj via SMM protocol
22 end
23 end
24 for i = 1 to n in parallel do
25 for j = 1 to n do
26 Ai locally calculates the summation of all j-shares of gradi,
denoted as 〈gradi〉j
27 Ai locally updates 〈wi〉j by 〈wi〉j ← 〈wi〉j − α|B| · 〈gradi〉j
28 end
29 end
30 end
31 for i = 1 to n do
32 for j = 1 to n and j 6= i do
33 Aj sends 〈wi〉j to Ai
34 end
35 Ai locally calculates the summation of {〈wi〉j}j∈[n], denoted as wi
36 end
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Secure Logistic Regression Protocol. Similar as the secure logistic regres-
sion protocol under horizontally partitioned data, one can use a k-order polyno-
mial to approximate the logistic function. After it, the polynomial can be easily
calculated using SMM protocol.
Security Proof.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 is secure against semi-honest adversaries, as in Def-
inition 1.
Proof. We skip the correctness proof of Algorithm 2 considering it is obvious.
To proof its security, for concise purpose, we use two parties as examples, i.e.,
A1 and A2, A1 has X1 and B has X2 and y. We construct two simulators SA1
and SA2 , such that
{SA1(1κ,X1,w1)}X1,X2,y,κ ∼= {viewA1(X1,X2,y, κ)}X1,X2,y,κ, (5)
{SB(1κ,X2,y,w2)}X1,X2,y,κ ∼= {viewB(X1,X2,y, κ)}X1,X2,y,κ, (6)
where viewA1 and viewA2 denotes the views of A1 and A2, respectively. We
prove the above equations for a corrupted A1 and a corrupted A2, respectively.
Corrupted A1. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-time simula-
tor SA1 that, when given the security parameter κ,A1’s input X1 and output w1,
can simulate the view of A1 in the protocol execution. To this end, we first ana-
lyzeA1’s view viewA1(X1,X2,y, κ) in Algorithm 2. The messages obtained byA1
are consisted of three parts. The first part is the messages sent before the train-
ing process, i.e., 〈y1〉, 〈w2〉1; the second part is the messages sent in the training
process, which are from SMM protocols, i.e.,
〈
X2Bt × 〈w2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X1Bt × 〈w1〉2
〉
2
,〈
〈err〉t1 ×X2Bt
〉
2
, and
〈
〈err〉t2 ×X1Bt
〉
2
; the third part is the message sent af-
ter the training process, i.e., 〈w1〉2. Therefore, viewA1(X1,X2,y, κ) consists
of A1’s input X1, the shares 〈y〉1, 〈w2〉1,
〈
X2Bt × 〈w2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X1Bt × 〈w1〉2
〉
2
,〈
〈err〉t1 ×X2Bt
〉
2
,
〈
〈err〉t2 ×X1Bt
〉
2
, and 〈w1〉2.
Given κ, X1, and w1, SA1 generates a simulation of viewA1(X1,X2,y, κ) as
the following steps.
– SA1 randomly selects shares 〈y′〉1 and 〈w′2〉1.
– SA1 simulates the SMM protocol, randomly generates
〈
X′2Bt × 〈w′2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X′1Bt × 〈w′1〉2
〉
2
,〈
〈err′〉t1 ×X′2Bt
〉
2
,
〈
〈err′〉t2 ×X′1Bt
〉
2
, and takes them as the output for A1
in SMM protocol.
– SA1 computes 〈w′1〉2 following Line 27 in Algorithm 2 using the simulated
results in previous steps.
– SA1 generates a simulation of viewA1(X1,X2,y, κ) by outputting (X1, 〈y′〉1,
〈w′2〉1,
〈
X′2Bt × 〈w′2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X′1Bt × 〈w′1〉2
〉
2
,
〈
〈err′〉t1 ×X′2Bt
〉
2
,
〈
〈err′〉t2 ×X′1Bt
〉
2
,
〈w′1〉2).
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Table 1. Dataset statistics.
Dataset News Blog Bank APS
Number of feature 61 180 17 171
Number of sample 39,797 52,397 45,211 60,000
Therefore, we have the following two equations:
viewA1(X
1,X2,y, κ)
= (X1, 〈y〉1, 〈w2〉1,
〈
X2Bt × 〈w2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X1Bt × 〈w1〉2
〉
2
,
〈
〈err〉t1 ×X2Bt
〉
2
,〈
〈err〉t2 ×X1Bt
〉
2
, 〈w1〉2),
SA1(X1,X2,y, κ)
= (X1, 〈y′〉1, 〈w′2〉1,
〈
X′2Bt × 〈w′2〉1
〉
2
,
〈
X′1Bt × 〈w′1〉2
〉
2
,
〈
〈err′〉t1 ×X′2Bt
〉
2
,〈
〈err′〉t2 ×X′1Bt
〉
2
, 〈w′1〉2).
We note that the probability distributions of A1’s view and SA1 ’s output
are computationally indistinguishable. This completes the proof in the case of
corrupted A1.
Corrupted A2. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-time simula-
tor SA2 that, when given the security parameter κ, A2’s input X2, y and output
w2, can simulate the view of A2 in the protocol execution. Following the proof
of Corrupted A1, one can simply proof that the probability distributions of A2’s
view and SA2 ’s output are computationally indistinguishable. This completes
the proof in the case of corrupted A2.
The above proof can be can be extended to multiple parties. Similarly, one
can also prove that Algorithm 1 is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Discussion. Before applying our proposed Algorithm 2 in practice, the batches
in each SGD iteration must be aligned for the parties. This is why we need the
step in Line 1. The alignment operation can be done efficiently by using private
set intersection [23], which can match the samples in different datasets and keep
the secure of these data at the same time.
4 Experiments and Applications
4.1 Dataset and Data Split Description
Dataset description. We use four public dataset to perform experiments, i.e.,
online news popularity dataset (News for short) [10], BlogFeedback dataset (Blog
for short) [2], Bank Marketing dataset (Bank for short) [21], and APS Failure
dataset (APS for short) [9]. The first two datasets are for linear regression task
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Table 2. RMSE and running time of (secure) linear regressions on News dataset.
Model LiRe Sec-LiRe-TI-V Sec-LiRe-OTI-V Sec-LiRe-TI-H Sec-LiRe-OTI-H
RMSE 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096
Time 32.41 70.28 246.31 78.52 274.11
and the last two datasets are for logistic regression task. We summarize their
statistics in Table 1. Note that for all the datasets, we normalize all the features
and labels so that they are robust to regression tasks.
Data split. For simplification, we only assume there are two parties. For Hor-
izontally data split setting, we assume the two parties have the same number
of samples. For vertically data split setting, we assume the two parties have the
same number of features. Note that, our protocols are suitable for any number
parties in practice.
4.2 Experimental Settings
Evaluation metric. We use Root Mean Square Error (RSME) to evaluate the
performance of (secure) linear regression models, and choose Area Under the
ROC Curve (AUC) to evaluate the performance of (secure) logistic regression
models.
Comparison methods. We propose secure linear regression and logistic re-
gression protocols for both Horizontally (H) and Vertically (V) partitioned data.
Therefore, we compare with plaintext linear regression (LiRe) and logistic re-
gression (LoRe) to study (1) whether they have the same accuracy, and (2)
what is the difference of their running time. Besides, we apply two SMM proto-
cols, i.e., with Trusted Initializer (TI) and withOut TI (OTI), for our proposed
secure regressions. Thus, for ablation study, we use Sec-LiRe-TI-H/Sec-LiRe-
OTI-H to denote secure linear regression model with/without trusted initializer
under horizontally partitioned data, and use Sec-LiRe-TI-V/Sec-LiRe-OTI-V to
denote secure linear regression model with/without trusted initializer under ver-
tically partitioned data. Similarly, we have Sec-LoRe-TI-H, Sec-LoRe-OTI-H,
Sec-LoRe-TI-V, and Sec-LoRe-OTI-V for logistic regression.
Parameter setting. For all the (secret sharing based) models, we set the batch
size to B = 5 and the number of iteration to 100, which means that we use
mini-batch gradient descent to train the model. We also search the learning rate
α in {0.001, 0.01, 0.1} to find its best values.
4.3 Comparison Results
We use five-fold cross validation during comparison, and report the average re-
sults. We summarize the comparison results, including RMSE/AUC and running
time (in seconds) in Tables 2-5. Note that we omit the offline Beaver triple gener-
ation time for the trusted-initializer based methods and use local area network.
From them, we observe that:
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Table 3. RMSE and running time of (secure) linear regressions on Blog dataset.
Model LiRe Sec-LiRe-TI-V Sec-LiRe-OTI-V Sec-LiRe-TI-H Sec-LiRe-OTI-H
RMSE 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125
Time 126.27 240.82 628.98 264.21 692.72
Table 4. AUC and running time of (secure) logistic regressions on Bank dataset.
Model LoRe Sec-LoRe-TI-V Sec-LoRe-OTI-V Sec-LoRe-TI-H Sec-LoRe-OTI-H
AUC 0.7849 0.7792 0.7792 0.7792 0.7792
Time 47.99 170.89 318.99 206.12 387.83
– Our proposed secure linear regression protocols have exactly the same perfor-
mance with plaintext ones, and secure logistic regression protocols also have
comparable performance with plaintext ones. This is because we use a 3-order
polynomial to approximate the logistic function.
– The computation time of our proposed secure linear regression and logistic
regression models are slower than plaintext ones, especially for the secure
logistic regression models. This is because it needs more rounds of SMM pro-
tocols for secure logistic regression to calculate the 3-order polynomial. Take
Sec-LoRe-OTI-H on News dataset for example, Sec-LoRe-OTI-H takes 9.06
times longer than plaintext LoRe, which is acceptable considering its ability
of protecting data privacy.
4.4 Time Complexity Analysis
We now study the time complexity of our proposed secure regression protocols,
and report the results in Figure 2, where we use the same setting as in compari-
son. From it, we can see that with the increase of data size, the running time of
our protocols scale linearly. This results demonstrate that our proposed model
can be applied into large scale dataset.
4.5 Applications
Our proposed secure regression models have been successfully deployed in vari-
ous tasks inside and outside Ant Financial, including intelligent marketing, risk
control, and intelligent lending. For example, CDFinance1, a bank in China,
together with Ant Financial deployed secure logistic regression models, which
not only significantly improved its risk control ability, but also transformed the
traditional offline lending mode into an online automatic lending mode.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we first made a computational reduction from the multiparty train-
ing of regression models to secure multiparty matrix summation multiplication.
1 http://www.cdfinance.com.cn/en/index
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Table 5. AUC and running time of (secure) logistic regressions on APS dataset.
Model LoRe Sec-LoRe-TI-V Sec-LoRe-OTI-V Sec-LoRe-TI-H Sec-LoRe-OTI-H
AUC 0.9807 0.9749 0.9749 0.9749 0.9749
Time 151.72 607.09 1138.82 722.16 1374.45
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Fig. 2. Running time (in seconds) with different data size.
Based on secret sharing schemes, we then proposed two secure regression algo-
rithms for horizontally and vertically partitioned data respectively. We finally
demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach by experiments,
and presented the real-world applications. In future, we would like to apply our
proposed protocols into more machine learning algorithms and deploy them into
more applications.
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